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Abstract
When it comes to occupational injury, disease, and fatalities, criminal prosecution and
punishment is the exception. This paper focuses on three loopholes in legal strategy
that make it difficult for determined social movements and committed prosecutors to
secure conviction against corporate executives: they are the notions (1) that
“modern” industrial risk is by essence impersonal and diluted, making the assignment
of individual responsibility difficult or impossible, (2) that industrial hazard is foreign to
any notion of intention, fault or responsibility, (3) that the certainty of the causal link
between exposure and damages must be established for each victim on a purely
individual, rather than statistical, basis. I describe how Italian prosecutors sought to
circumvent these loopholes in the Eternit asbestos maxi-trials. Although there appear
to be solid legal workarounds for the first and second loophole, the third one remains
problematic, calling for urgent political and legal imagination.
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Introduction
When it comes to employer responsibility for failing to prevent occupational
injury, disease and fatalities among employees, criminal prosecution and
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punishment is the exception.1 Institutions that treat situations of worker expo-
sure to industrial hazards usually keep them out of the penal realm—making
it difficult to even imagine that one could proceed otherwise. Corporate interests
uphold the idea that they should have a right to immunity, and that any attempt
to hold them accountable for dangerous working conditions is economical-
ly unsound.
This paper focuses on three loopholes in legal strategy that make it difficult
for determined social movements and committed prosecutors to secure convic-
tion against corporate executives suspected of negligent exposure of workers to
industrial hazard, with or without resulting consequences—in other words, of
“safety crime.”2 These loopholes are the following three notions: (1) that
“modern” industrial risk is by essence impersonal and diluted, making the
assignment of individual responsibility difficult or impossible, (2) that industrial
hazard is foreign to any notion of intention, fault or responsibility, and (3) that
the certainty of the causal link between exposure and damages must be estab-
lished for each victim on a purely individual, rather than statistical, basis. While
the first two loopholes hold for fatalities, injuries and disease alike, the third is
specific to multifactorial disease with long latency periods, such as cancer.
What is at stake here is the possibility of ever securing a conviction in the
event of negligent exposure to occupational hazards. This paper shows how
prosecution sought to circumvent these loopholes in the Eternit Turin asbestos
maxi-trials, with more or less success. Although there appear to be solid legal
workarounds for the first and second loophole, the third one remains problem-
atic. Criminal law is ill-equipped to deal with multifactorial diseases with long
latency periods, despite the fact that the latter have become the main killers in
the workplace during the twentieth century.3 This calls for urgent political and
legal imagination in order to ensure that a vast territory of potentially criminal
behavior, harming workers around the world, does not remain forever off-limits
for criminal justice.
The Eternit maxi-trials were closely followed by victims of occupational dis-
ease and corporate executives around the world. They were held in Turin and
Rome between 2009 and 2014 and opposed the People of Italy to the former
managers and owners of four asbestos manufacturing plants in Italy.4 This
unique case came as the crowning moment of four decades of Italian legal
activism around the preservation of worker health. It was a rare moment in
which the possibility of criminal punishment for worker injury and disease sud-
denly became credible and challenged the long-standing practices and represen-
tations that usually keep such offenses out of the criminal realm. As a sociologist
with the French National Center for Scientific Research, I had the opportunity
to study the Eternit case from a historical, sociological, and legal perspective,
through interviews in Turin and Casale Monferrato with many of the main
protagonists, the study of documents used in the proceedings, as well as the
analysis of the decisions.
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In the Eternit case, the defendants argued that their past behavior could not
and should not be criminally prosecuted. This is the specific quality of safety
crime, and more generally of white-collar crime: defense strategies can focus as
much on exculpation—“the defendant did not do this”—as on keeping the case
out of the criminal realm—“even if the defendant did do this, this is no matter
for criminal justice.” Such a strategy is facilitated when it can rely on legal
loopholes—areas that have been insufficiently explored by legal scholarship
and political imagination, roads less taken, unthought of or unthinkable solu-
tions. Social science has pinpointed the challenge of “undone science” in public
health cases.5 This paper draws attention to the undone political and legal
reflection about solutions which would make criminal law fully applicable to
hazards that are constitutive of our times.
The Noncriminalization of Safety Crimes: An Overview
“Safety crimes” have been defined as “acts of commission or omission by
employers that imperil the health and/or safety of their employees.”6 They are
acts that would usually be considered criminal if they occurred outside of the
work environment—or in another country.7
According to Sutherland, exposure to workplace hazards is a case in point of
“white-collar crime,” that is, “illegal behavior [which] receives the attention of
administrative commissions and of courts operating under civil or equity juris-
diction,”8 thus avoiding the stigma of criminal treatment. Sutherland discusses
the famous case of the Hawks Nest tunnel, near Gauley Bridge, Virginia, which
was drilled in 1930–1931: “. . . out of 1500 workers on this project, an appalling
number, estimated variously between the limits of 200 and 500, died from sili-
cosis while many others were permanently injured.”9 This did not result in
convictions, although it clearly contradicted the time’s medical knowledge and
existing prevention technology.10
For historical reasons, exposure to industrial hazard and ensuing damages
have been managed by institutions other than criminal justice. The fact that
these institutions have claimed longstanding “ownership”11 of this public prob-
lem hinders any attempt at criminalization.
Labor inspectorates were created in most industrialized countries during the
nineteenth century to control the adequacy of working conditions. Their
monopoly on these issues generally did not result in more criminalization.
They ended up concentrating their attention on formal rather than substantial
violations, because of a structural shortage of inspectors, which did not allow
for a thorough examination of the reality of working conditions in every factory.
As British criminologist and historian W.G. Carson writes,
. . . inspectors rapidly begin to evolve routine modes of inspection which, without
abdicating from the attempt to regulate, acknowledge the power differentials
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permeating their relationship with the employers, tolerate certain levels of violation
as acceptable, and institutionalize alternative methods of control.12
Carson describes the circular process through which labor inspections comfort
the “conventional” (i.e., noncriminalized) nature of factory crime:
. . . once a “low-profile” approach to legal proceedings has been institutionalized
within an enforcement agency, a sort of circular process ensues: the crime remains
conventional because it is only infrequently prosecuted, and is infrequently pros-
ecuted because it is conventional.13
As of the second half of the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth, work-
ers’ compensation schemes were implemented in Switzerland, Austria, England,
Russia, Italy, France, Japan, Canada, and some U.S. states.14–16 Most of these
schemes carry the implicit idea that “professional risk” is an unavoidable feature
of modernity and that therefore, the modern way of governing this risk is financial
compensation by a state-guaranteed insurance plan, rather than litigation based
on the supposedly outdated notions of fault and responsibility. Berman calls this
system the “compensation-safety apparatus” that purports to “solve” the issue of
occupational exposure through the verification of procedural conformity and the
allocation of fixed-rate compensation.17
In the United States, the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) in the 1970s made the compensation-safety apparatus
more complex. Rosner shows that the effect of the criminal penalties laid out by
OSHA was to stifle any legal enterprise purporting to treat occupational fatal-
ities or disease as a crime.18 Conversely, the weakening of OSHA in the 1980s
did incite some state attorney generals to launch criminal action in such cases.
A few landmark decisions around 1990 tended to safeguard the idea that OSHA
criminal penalties did not overlap with state prosecutors’ efforts, though a cur-
sory overview of American case law seems to show that this new trend quickly
died down afterward, perhaps because prosecutors became stymied by the high
bar for proving intent to harm.19,20
There is a “relatively unorganized resentment of the public”21 against the “slow
violence” of exposure to industrial hazard.22 Leftist and progressive political or
union-based movements that denounce and improve working conditions have
often been reluctant to call for penal repression because of their anti-prison
mind-set. For example, in 1970s France, Maoist groups inspired by Foucault
had some difficulty advocating that criminal employers receive prison sentences.23
The ideological and financial proximity between business interests and the
state is another reason for noncriminalization. Exposure to industrial hazard
and occupational injury are presented as a set of facts that cannot be punished
without great prejudice to the entire economy. As Fauconnet, a student of
Durkheim, writes in his sociological study of responsibility: “societies tend to
4 NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy 0(0)
punish, but they also resist punishing.”24 The reasons not to punish stem not so
much “from the consideration of the crime, as from the consideration of the
patient who would have to bear the brunt of punishment.”24 Some groups ben-
efit from a kind of immunity because of their financial or political clout.
Likewise, Sutherland writes that “the persons who define business practices as
undesirable and illegal are customarily called ‘communists’ or ‘socialists’ and
their definitions carry little weight.”25 In his study of occupational danger in
British North Sea oil rigs, Carson points out the “political economy of speed,”26
in other words, the geopolitical and economic rationale of the oil rush, which
justifies the disregard for basic safety regulation. In the case of Canada, Bittle
and Snider consider that the “deep-seated socio-political commitment to capital-
ism” is behind the difficulty to criminalize safety crimes.27
The Eternit Asbestos Maxi-Trials in Turin: A Case Study
Founded at the beginning of the twentieth century, Eternit SpA (Societa per
azioni—a form of corporation in Italy) was an Italian group, with headquarters
in Genoa, that manufactured products (roof tiles, tubes) based on the Eternit
asbestos-cement patent. The last factory closed in 1986. At the beginning of the
2000s, the office of the Turin public prosecutor started a lengthy investigation
focused on the top managers (coming after previous investigations and trials).
This resulted in a criminal trial, commonly known in Italy as the Eternit maxi-
trial (maxiprocesso is a word usually used for antimafia trials), held between
2009 and 2011 before in Turin. The “maxi” prefix refers to the number of
victims, the high status of the defendants and the length of the trial. Two
wealthy industrial magnates, the Swiss Stephan Schmidheiny and the Belgian
Louis de Cartier de Marchienne, identified as the de facto top executives and
owners of the four Italian plants considered, were charged with two counts of
felony: omission of safety measures (Article 437) and intentional exposure to an
environmental disaster (Article 434). An estimated figure of 2987 victims was
quoted during the trial, 1800 of which were already deceased, mainly from lung
cancer, pleural mesothelioma, or asbestosis, diseases that are classically found in
excess in populations exposed to asbestos. Most of the diseased were former
workers, but some were relatives of workers (who described being exposed to
asbestos brought home on work overalls), and some just neighbors of the plant,
with no family connection to the work force (exposed to airborne asbestos
around the premises).
Dozens of lawyers represented the defendants and the civil parties. Asbestos
victims and activists from all over the world followed the proceedings from
abroad. In February 2012, more than a thousand of them flocked to hear the
verdict, taking up most of the rooms of the Turin courthouse (the decision was
transmitted and translated in real time).
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In the first decision,28 the judges pronounced both defendants guilty on both
counts and sentenced them to sixteen years imprisonment each. An appeals trial
was held, also in Turin, and on 3 June 2013, the judges sentenced the Swiss
defendant to eighteen years imprisonment, considering that there were aggra-
vating circumstances concerning the moral element (intention) of the crime.29
The Belgian defendant died a few weeks prior to the decision. On 19 November
2014, Italy’s supreme court, the Corte di Cassazione, canceled the Court of
Appeal decision,30 on the basis of the statute of limitations. The judges decided
that the expression “disaster” referred only to the exposure, rather than to the
ensuing epidemic of asbestos-related disease, which is still ongoing. They also
considered that the disaster had ceased the day the last factory had closed, at the
end of the 1980s. This reasoning was hotly disputed among legal scholars and
activists, because to this day the pollution is still present in the environment,
long after the factories have closed.
Criminalizing Worker Injury: A Turinese Tradition
Italy experienced a consistent mobilization from the 1960s onward which aimed
at criminal prosecution of corporate injury and killings. The intensity and scope
of this mobilization—which brought together organized labor, environmental
activists, physicians, and legal professionals—was probably unrivaled in con-
temporary European or American history.
The genesis of the case is best followed through the biography of one man,
former Turin prosecutor Raffaelle Guariniello. Born in 1941 in a small village of
the province of Alessandria (thirty miles from the asbestos plant of Casale
Monferrato), the son of a tailor, he studied in Turin and entered the judicial
profession in 1967, where he represented the state as pretore then procuratore.31
In the 1960s, Turin was alive with intense intellectual and political debates about
new ways of improving working conditions.32 They were driven by strong
unions in the Fiat Mirafiori plant (the largest automobile plant in Europe at
the time) and the Farmitalia chemical factory, with the support of physicians
such as the influential Ivar Oddone. In the name of health, workers demanded
the right to decide themselves, and collectively, how work should be organized
and their health protected, summarizing this under the slogan non-delegazione.33
One national translation of this was the 1970 Statute of Workers which provid-
ed, in its Article 9, that workers were in charge of controlling, through their
union representatives, that the laws on working conditions and health preven-
tion were being enforced.
Rather than a unilateral worker victory, this statute was the “outcome of
contradictory political and economic forces”34 which continued to run through
industrial workplaces after it. Within occupational medicine, a conservative
streak continued to resist the more progressive new generation. In the world
of law, organizations such as Magistratura Democratica (founded in 1964)
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pushed legal professionals to go beyond symbolic proclamations and better
understand the experience of manual workers. In 1974, the Supreme Council
of Magistrates (CSM) organized a conference entitled “Expanding our focus to
occupational disease,” in partnership with the Italian General Confederation of
Labour (CGIL) union of metallurgists. Guariniello helped organize the first
criminal trials around questions of occupational disease. The IPCA factory in
Cirie`, nicknamed the “Cancer Manufacturing Plant” (fabbrica del cancro)
because of the bladder cancer epidemic among its workers,35 was the subject
of an important 1977 decision of the Turin Tribunal, which sentenced the com-
pany’s managers to six years imprisonment for manslaughter. It was the first
time in contemporary Italian history that occupational manslaughter was pun-
ished by a prison sentence.
A few years later, Guarinello published a book in which he laid out his plan
to make sure that an “elementary legal principle” would be respected at last:
“that sickness which is caused by intentional exposure to toxic substances in the
work environment can be construed as one of the crimes—injury or homicide—
punishable by all Penal Codes since 1859.”36 The prosecutor wrote that legal
professionals should learn from similar cases abroad such as Minamata Disease
in Japan, should partner with epidemiologists to advance scientific knowledge
on the causes of disease and death among workforces and communities, and
should try to move up the hierarchy of the incriminated plants so as not to
punish (only) middle management for decisions that are often taken at the
highest level.
Immediately after publishing this book, Guariniello created an “Observatory of
Occupational Cancer” managed directly by the Turin procura. Located in the his-
toric center of Turin, permanently staffed with five to ten people under the guid-
ance of an epidemiologist, it identified potential cancer clusters from physicians’
reports and hospital records, prompting investigations and many subsequent trials.
Since the 1970s, Guariniello had started investigating negligent exposure in
the Eternit asbestos factories. This had already resulted in trials in which the
responsibility of lower level managers had been recognized. In 1996, the trial of
the managers of the Italian Asbestos Society (SIA), a medium-sized asbestos-
processing company, was held in Turin. Nine of them were found guilty for the
diseases and deaths of workers. During the same period, the Porto Marghera
trial opened in Venice in 1998.37 The plant was a huge petrochemical one,
located across the laguna from the touristic city. Prosecution linked the diseases
of hundreds of workers to their occupational exposure to vinyl chloride mono-
mer (VCM).
Producing Organizational Opacity
To whom can one, and should one, assign responsibility for industrial disease?
The dominant notion is that modern industrial organizations are intrinsically
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too complex for notions of individual responsibility. “Accidents happen,”38 as if
industrial hazard was some unavoidable feature of nature, on par with extreme
weather or geologic events. Even the founding father of the study of white-collar
crime, Sutherland, supports the idea:
the old employers’ liability laws, which were based on the principle of individual
responsibility, broke down because responsibility for industrial accidents could not
be located. Workmen’s compensation laws were substituted, with their principle
that the industrial establishment should bear the cost of industrial accidents.39
The specific protections granted over time to corporations, such as the
“corporate veil,” certainly reinforced this difficulty to assign individual respon-
sibility, producing a “diffusion of responsibility.”40 Tombs shows that in the
United Kingdom, the 2007 “Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide
Act” made the “corporate veil” more difficult to pierce. While this action was
done in an apparent trade-off with the possibility of prosecuting the corporation
itself, records show that there have been very few successful prosecutions and
acquittals in the following decade, and that large corporations seem particularly
protected from criminal justice.41
The Eternit case suggests that the difficulty to assign responsibility does not
only stem from exogeneous, “modern” factors such as the complexity of indus-
trial organizations and the specific nature of contemporary industrial disease. It
can also be explained by active, endogeneous efforts from would-be defendants
to make it difficult to assign individual responsibility.
For example, the Swiss industrial magnate Stephan Schmidheiny was prose-
cuted for his alleged responsibility as owner and top manager of the Italian
Eternit factories between the mid-1970s and their closing at the end of the
1980s. The prosecutor’s investigation uncovered elements that suggest that
Schimdheiny then started preparing for the possibility of a criminal trial, prob-
ably because the issue had recently become highly litigious in countries such as
the United States.42 Between 1984 and 2005, Schmidheiny continuously
employed the Milan-based consulting firm of Guido Bellodi.4,43,44 Its mission,
as defined through the archives that were seized in a 2005 police raid, was to
contain the responsibility for exposure to asbestos in and around the Italian
Eternit factories, at a level that would not imperil the Swiss defendant.
Bellodi’s efforts were mirrored by other attempts to shape a morally flawless
persona through biographical work. Throughout the nineteen pages of a 1991
interview to the Family Business Review, neither Schmidheiny nor his obliging
sparring partner use the word “asbestos” a single time. When describing the way
his father shared the family business between his two sons, Schmidheiny vaguely
explains: “my older brother would handle the cement part and I would be
responsible for the rest.”45 The “rest” being: asbestos.
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As Sutherland suggests, the “pyramiding of companies and juggling with cor-
porate entities” are convenient tools to opacify individual criminal responsibility.46
In the 2010s, in its press releases responding to the various decisions, Schmidheiny’s
legal team invariably presented the defendant as, at most, a minority shareholder:
“he never had any formal function within the Italian Eternit, he neither was owner
nor member of the Board of Directors nor member of the management”47; “The
company [Schmidheiny] headed—SEG—merely held a stake in the publicly listed
Italian Eternit SpA. In the latter’s 80-year history, SEG was the largest single
shareholder from 1973 to 1986 only.”48 This argument is all the more difficult to
counter that the organization of the world asbestos industry is extremely complex,
as illustrated by the fact that in Europe at least five companies, based in different
countries, are named Eternit (after an asbestos-cement patent).
Yet, this alternate history did not hold in the face of historical inquiry. Turin
associate prosecutor Sara Panelli and “white-collar-crime” sociologist Rosalba
Altopiedi wrote various papers describing Schmidheiny’s personal involvement
in the Italian asbestos factories.43,44 Their findings played a crucial role in the
proceedings. At the beginning of 2015, an English-language translation of one
their articles was to be published as an e-book. Schmidheiny’s legal representa-
tives immediately challenged this publication, and the local history organization
behind the translation project preferred to retract the book rather than face
litigation which it could not afford. A translation was nevertheless published
by the U.S. based “Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization” in 2016.44
Thus, the Turin investigations and trials defeated this containment strategy,
bringing back to the forefront the asbestos past which all official biographies
sought to minimize. Ironically, the Court of Appeal considered that “the method-
ical erasing of all traces which began in a period when [Schimdheiny] was not even
suspected or tried speak to the inexcusable nature of his personal role.”49
Admittedly, the active containment strategy carried out during more than
two decades forced public prosecution to rely on broad historical study, which
was costly in manpower and time. Yet, prosecution showed that it was possible,
through this careful study, to determine individual responsibility even in such
complex organizations, confirming what has been shown for other industries by
professional historians.50
No Offense Intended?
In his study of labor inspection in nineteenth century Britain, Carson notes that
factory crime is rarely “prosecuted, and when it is, this course of action is almost
invariably predicated upon some rough notion of mens rea as perceived by the
relevant Inspectorate.”51 He suggests that an 1844 law that
remov[ed] the issue of intention from the crimes of employers [. . .] took a sub-
stantial step towards the doctrine of strict liability which sets certain crimes apart
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from “ordinary” crimes and has led many jurists to argue that such offenses should
not really be regarded as criminal at all.52
In other words, the lack of intention justifies that industrial disease is not pros-
ecuted as a crime. Conversely, securing an element of intention is a sine qua non
condition to prosecute such a situation successfully.
Obviously, most employers do not wish injury or death upon their workers,
except in specific situations where workers are part of a minority group which is
targeted by a broader political campaign.53,54 Compensation schemes generally
ignore the element of intention, and thus raising any debate about intention can
seem quite exotic. When incriminated, employers usually defend themselves by
stating that they followed the formal procedures of risk management over a
given period. Any question about the knowledge that they may have had that
these procedures were insufficient to protect workers is actively discarded by
identifying “the gaps in knowledge rather than the continuities,”55 and more
generally by stating that there is no reason industry should be in advance on the
laws of its time.
The Eternit case did not follow the usual script: both of the charges pressed
include an element of intention. Article 434 refers to “intentional disasters,”
while article 437 concerns “intentional removal or omission of prevention meas-
ures against occupational hazard.” Public prosecution, and the judges, only
included a fairly low level of intention—but intention, nonetheless.
It was in a previous, equally high-profile case that Guariniello had started
crafting his legal practice concerning intention.56 During the night of 5 to 6
December 2007, a fire engulfed a production line in the ThyssenKrupp steel-
works in Turin, killing seven workers. Charges were pressed against the com-
pany as well as six of its managers. In a move that surprised the Italian legal
world, Harald Espenhahn, managing director of ThyssenKrupp for Italy, was
charged with omicidio doloso (intentional, or fraudulent, homicide) rather than
omicidio coloposo (manslaughter), which is the usual charge in such cases.
Guariniello based himself on internal correspondence which showed that a
few months before the Turin disaster, Espenhahn had been warned by the fac-
tory director of serious fire hazards. According to prosecution, Espenhahn was
aware that there had been a similar fire in a German factory only a year earlier,
but had nevertheless decided to deny the Turin director the security investments
he was asking for.
Guariniello considered that there was a degree of intention in the managing
director’s negligence, because even though he was fully aware of the possibly
tragic consequences of his decision not to act, he did not falter in his decision.
The first judge followed Guariniello on this reasoning, while the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court confirmed the condemnation for manslaughter
but removed the intentional element.
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Nevertheless, the Thyssen case was the defining moment of the notion of dolo
eventuale in Italian legal doctrine concerning safety crimes57—dolus eventualis in
Latin, which can be translated into English as “eventual fraud.” This notion is
commonplace and considered unproblematic when discussing negligence while
driving, which often involves showing “that a ‘responsible person’ would have
foreseen” the negative outcome.58 Eventual fraud was famously mobilized
during the criminal trial of South African athlete Oscar Pistorius, which con-
sidered that he knew that he would kill the person (in fact, his wife) who was
locked in the bathroom when he shot four rounds through the door.
The Pistorius trial popularized the strange-sounding expression of “murder
without intent.”
Eventual fraud is about accepting risk, rather than trying to avoid it. The
seven steelworkers did not lose their life to a meteor or a lightning bolt, but as a
result of a chain of events which included clear decisions to act, regardless of
eventually tragic consequences. This is why Guariniello considered eventual
fraud an essential part of any prosecution of occupational and environmental
crimes, which hinge on the notion of “permissible” or “acceptable” risk, or in
other words, exposure to hazards that is balanced against profitability.
The defendants strongly opposed their depiction as willful injurers.
For example, Schmidheiny’s press release after the Supreme Court decision
caricatured the former judges’ decision to include an element of intention.
In their verdicts, they constructed a full-blown conspiracy theory and alleged that
Stephan Schmidheiny was fully aware of the dangers of asbestos processing.
Motivated by pure greed, he allegedly orchestrated a global campaign to deceive
the public about these dangers. As the ‘party actually responsible’ for the Italian
Eternit SpA, he was, they alleged, consciously prepared to accept the deaths of
thousands of people and intentionally caused a disaster that persists to this day.48
In fact, this account was very distant from what was actually discussed in the
two first trials. In the Eternit case, prosecution produced documents that
showed that the Belgian defendant was present in meetings which took place
in 1968, during which the scholarship of Irving Selikoff, the leading medical
researcher on asbestos,59 was discussed. According to Guariniello, this showed
his clear knowledge of the eventual consequences of not implementing proper
cleaning, aspiration or humidification of dusty environments. As for the Swiss
defendant, it was shown that he delivered a speech in Neuss, Switzerland in June
1976 in front of thirty-five top managers, during which he discussed the health
consequences of exposure to asbestos. The judges considered he demonstrated
his grasp of the matter, discussing asbestosis, lung cancer, mesothelioma, and
referring to Selikoff’s works. Yet, he did not implement all the prevention
measures that were warranted.
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Statistical Certainty Versus Individual Uncertainty in the
Demonstration of Causality
Can an individual’s sickness be linked to a specific situation of exposure, with
the degree of certainty necessary to secure criminal conviction? In the case of
occupational and environmental cancer, which have come to epitomize the
modern risks caused by industrial activity, most legal scholars and professionals
tend to answer negatively. This is because medical science studies the causation
of cancer through statistical studies on large populations: a population exposed
to a potential factor is compared to a population that is not exposed to it, and
correlations between the factor and the prevalence of the disease are established
(or not). Epidemiological inquiry is the gold standard of medical certainty.
Conversely, the knowledge on the dangerousness of a toxicant is drawn from
the statistical studies that show its correlation with disease.
From these statistical results, there is no way to infer causality at an individ-
ual level—i.e., between a person’s sickness and their past or present work—with
the same level of certainty. In other words, it is scientifically impossible to prove
that an individual would not have contracted cancer had he or she not worked in
such company during such period (and been exposed to such factor). The only
thing one can prove, if the exposed population is big enough, and if confounding
factors are few enough, is that such determinate number of workers (or neigh-
bors) would not have contracted cancer had they not been exposed. But in no
way is it possible to determine the identity of those who, among the individuals
affected by cancer today, would not have suffered the same plight in the absence
of exposure. This is true even for rare forms of cancer for which only one causal
agent is identified (so-called “signature cancers,” such as pleural mesothelioma,
caused by asbestos, or liver angiosarcoma, caused by vinyl chloride monomer).
Quid of exposure to asbestos or vinyl chloride monomer at home? Hence, sta-
tistical certainty, when addressing causality at a population level, cannot be
translated into individual certainty.
This scientific fact is a clear challenge to criminal justice. In some situations, it
is possible to determine the number of victims that have contracted disease
because of exposure to an industrial hazard, but it is not possible to judge
this exposure and its effects, because the victims’ identity cannot be established.
This was the case in the town of Casale Monferrato, where the flagship of Italian
Eternit factories was located. Longitudinal epidemiological studies60 based on
many decades of cumulative research (often paid for by the prosecutor’s office)
showed for example that male workers in the Casale Monferrato plant were 32
times more likely to have died from pleural cancer, 27.3 times more likely to
have died from peritoneum cancer, 2.3 times more likely to have died from lung
cancer, and 545 times more likely to have died from asbestosis, than the general
male population of the Piedmont region. As for female workers in the plant,
they were 2.27 times more likely to have developed ovary cancer than the female
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reference population. However, it is impossible to establish who exactly, among
the thousands of victims of these diseases listed on local registers, would
not have contracted the disease had he or she not worked in the factory,
or lived near it.
The Italian legal tradition had a way around this problem until the beginning
of the 2000s. This doctrine, known as the “increase of mortality criteria,” stated
that a person’s sickness could be blamed on a defendant if it was demonstrated
that the latter’s behavior had increased the risk, for the exposed subject,
of contracting this sickness. However, in 2001, a leading Italian legal scholar
published a study in which he refuted this doctrine which had led to all previous
sentences for manslaughter in relation to occupational disease.61,62 Stella criti-
cized this reasoning because it did not protect the rights of defense. He consid-
ered it did not abide by the classic penal criteria that the incriminated behavior
should be a sine qua non condition for the individual damage. Stella argued that
it was necessary to demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, for each person, that
their sickness would not have occurred if the subject had not been exposed to the
harmful working conditions. In other words, he compelled prosecution to dem-
onstrate what is impossible to demonstrate.
In their 2001 decision on the Porto Marghera case, the judges in Venice
followed this and acquitted all defendants. This reasoning was confirmed by
Supreme Court decisions in 2002. From that point on, demonstrating a general
causal link between exposure to a hazard and a type of disease was no longer
enough; individual causality had to be demonstrated also through counter-
factual reasoning, with a probability “near 100%.” With the new doctrine,
occupational and environmental cancer had suddenly become off-limits for
criminal justice.
Public prosecution came up with a new strategy in the Eternit maxi-trials.
It implied prosecuting exposure as a crime in itself, regardless of its potential
consequences. For both of the charges pressed in the Eternit maxi-trials, the
crime solely consists in the exposure to the impending risk. Thus, according to
article 434, “renting out buildings on the verge of collapsing and other intentional
disasters,” the fact that the building eventually collapses and harms its inhabi-
tants is considered an aggravating circumstance, not a necessary condition. The
“and other intentional disasters” addition provides for extensions to similar sit-
uations. Prosecution considered that this was the case for the asbestos plants: a
clear danger potentially harming an indeterminate number of people, to which
top executives exposed the work force as well as the surrounding population.
The advantage of this strategy, from prosecution’s point of view, was that it no
longer implied demonstrating causality on an individual scale. Demonstrating
exposure was relatively easy, drawing on testimony from former workers, neigh-
bors, managers, and on past labor inspection and company archives.
Epidemiological results were also used to prove exposure, with the following
reasoning: the fact that there was an excess of victims of disease among workers
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and neighbors of factories (when compared to a reference population) proved
that there has been an abnormally high exposure to the risk factor.
The prosecutor’s office repeatedly stated that exposure charges were the most
efficient way to create a link between criminal justice and prevention of occu-
pational hazards, as they could be pressed without having to wait decades
for widespread damage to be verified. Prosecution also wished to play on the
expressive function of punishment:63 the sentences linked to each of the charges
were severe enough (three to twelve years for Article 434, added up with three to
ten years for Article 437) for them to look similar to the ones pronounced for
manslaughter, and therefore, potentially, for victims to feel that their plight had
been taken seriously, and, possibly, for employers to consider that they had to
start complying with these laws.
The defense lawyers tried to shift the debate back to the more common ter-
rain of individual causality. During the first trial, one of the defense experts
reviewed the particulars of many cases of Eternit Casale workers who had been
officially recognized as having an occupational disease and listed what he con-
sidered were inaccuracies and approximations in individual files. His ultimate
aim was to invalidate the epidemiological reasoning according to which the
excess of victims proved the exposure to asbestos.
The judges resisted this push back toward individual causality. The Court of
Appeals decision, in particular, justifies the prosecution of exposure by equating
it with the demonstration of what it calls “collective causality.” Establishing
collective causality means showing that,
had the defendants not acted in a way which contributed to the diffusion of asbes-
tos in the workplace and the surrounding environment, the thesis stating that the
population considered in the epidemiological study was exposed to danger would
no longer stand.29
Behind this complex legalese was the idea that “collective causality” was
synonymous, in the end, with the demonstration of exposure to toxic work-
ing conditions.
In a twenty-page section, the decision refers to the commanding inspiration of
the French historical school known as the Annales, founded by Marc Bloch and
Lucien Febvre, to justify the use of certain tools which can “bring to light [. . .] the
slow evolution of certain phenomena,” and can “make certain aspects emerge
that lack, by essence, immediate empirical evidence,” in other words that are
invisible to the naked eye.29 The Annales historians used quantitative datasets
on long periods to get to this hidden stratum of reality. For the Turin judges,
epidemiology and the concept of collective causality will do the job. In the Eternit
case, victims “when considered individually are not relevant, they only are when
considered collectively.”29 They consider that epidemiological inference must be
used to grasp “the influence of specific risk factors” and cannot be challenged by
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individual inaccuracies (such as the ones pointed out by defense consultants), as
long as this error is not systematically biased in one direction.29
There were important drawbacks to this legal strategy. Some scholars con-
sidered it a kind of renunciation, as it meant focusing on the public disorder of
exposure to hazard, while ignoring (for technical reasons) the greater public
disorder of mass disease.64 Another legal drawback, which would prove fatal,
was that by dealing with exposure, this strategy focused on events which had
occurred many decades ago, rather than on a series of diseases which continue
to be diagnosed to this day. This paved the way for the final annulment on the
basis of the statute of limitations.
Conclusion
The Eternit maxi-trials showed that despite organizational complexity, individ-
ual corporate responsibility could be determined through careful historical
research. They also were an important moment in the global reflection on inten-
tionality in worker exposure to occupational hazards: as French philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre said in 1970 after the accidental death of sixteen miners in
the north of France, in such cases “the agency of fate has a human face”
(cette fatalite´ a un visage d’homme).65 Finally, the Eternit maxi-trials paved
the way for a legal solution to the problem of causal uncertainty concerning
individual victims, in cases where the causal link to exposure can only be deter-
mined on a population, statistical level.
Despite victims’ and prosecutors’ thriving imagination and willpower, the
Italian criminal code is still ill-equipped to deal with cancer, that is, the kind
of occupational (and, one may add, environmental) damage which seems par-
adigmatic of our times. This is true a fortiori for most other countries, much less
advanced in this discussion.
All concerned protagonists must dismiss, once and for all, the dream of
establishing the causal link between exposure and disease on an individual
level, and devise new tools to criminalize exposure and damages, based solely
on statistically established facts.
Since 2007, Italian legal scholar L. Masera has been pushing to import a
doctrine of “alternative verification,” developed in German public health
trials, and applying it to victims of occupational disease.66 His reasoning goes
as follows: Epidemiology can prove that there have been victims within a certain
population. What it cannot do is identify by name the victims who would have
not have fallen ill or died, had they not been exposed. But is this identification
by name necessary? Masera considers that criminal prosecution needs only to
establish the number of victims, not their identity. However, this doctrine is still
considered very audacious by the mainstream of the Italian legal profession. In
any case, the future of the judicial treatment of industrial hazards is not deter-
mined so much by what is possible, as by what is considered suitable and timely.
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This paper suggests that the notions of legal possibility and opportunity to crim-
inalize are difficult to dissociate.
In Italy, there is no respite in the struggle to prosecute and judge these crimes.
In the so-called Eternit bis case, Guariniello filed murder charges against
Schmidheiny in summer of 2014, a few months before the annulment of the
Eternit decisions and his retiring, concerning more than 200 deaths. The matter
then went through almost four years of travel through the Constitutional Court
and the Court of Cassation, on such issues as whether Schmidheny could be
charged with murder, or whether the charges should be reduced to manslaughter
(they were eventually ordered reduced) and whether it was “double jeopardy” to
try Schmidheiny for the same acts, as his lawyers put it (that appeal was refused
by the courts). What resulted was that there are to be four separate trials in
which Schmidheiny will be tried for manslaughter, one in each region of Italy in
which the deaths occurred (Turin, Naples, Vercelli, Reggio Emilia). The Turin
trial was the first one to start in April 2018. The judgment will probably be
announced in 2019 (followed months later by the court’s “Motivation” in which
the legal reasoning behind the verdict is explained). The Naples trial started in
April 2019. It will be interesting to analyze the decisions when they are pub-
lished, and eventually see what new solutions have been devised in the battle for
corporate accountability in safety crimes.
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